This paper discusses the volenti non fit injuria maxim. The volenti maxim states that a person is not wronged by that to which she consents, provided her consent is valid. I will argue, however, that the volenti maxim does not apply to all instances of valid consent. In some cases the consenter is wronged even if his consent is valid. Valid consent can only release others from consent-sensitive duties, not from consent-insensitive duties. If the consentee flouts a consent-insensitive duty the (...) consentee wrongs the consenter and thereby commits a wrong. (shrink)

How do we change the normative landscape by making requests? It will be argued that by making requests we create reasons for action if and only if certain conditions are met. We are able to create reasons if and only if doing so is valuable for the requester, and if they respect the requestee. Respectful requests have a normative force – it will be argued – because it is of instrumental value to us that we all have the normative power (...) of creating reasons by making requests. The normative power has the potential for creating and shaping valuable interactions and relationships for the requester and the requestee. This potential could not be realized if we did not have the normative power of making requests. It will also be shown why this account of the normative force of requests should be preferred to the two alternative accounts of the reason-giving force of requests that have been put forward by James H.P. Lewis and David Enoch. (shrink)

Perceptual constancies have been studied by psychologists for decades, but in recent years, they have also become a major topic in the philosophy of mind. One reason for this surge of interest is Tyler Burge’s (2010) influential claim that constancy mechanisms mark the difference between perception and mere sensitivity, and thereby also the difference between organisms with genuine representational capacities and ‘mindless’ beings. Burge’s claim has been the subject of intense debate. It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that we cannot (...) hope to settle this debate (as well as related debates in the philosophy of mind) without a clear and substantive theoretical account of what perceptual constancies are. In the first part of this paper, I argue that the standard definitions in the literature fall short of providing such an account. Still, as I aim to show in the second part of the paper, by taking a closer look at some of the paradigm examples, it is possible to construct a plausible general account of perceptual constancies that is both clear and substantive, and that can serve as a firm foundation for settling debates like the dispute about Burge’s ‘constancy mechanism criterion’ for perception. (shrink)

Perceptual representations have distal content: they represent external objects and their properties, not light waves or retinal images. This basic fact presents a fundamental problem for ‘input-oriented’ theories of perceptual content. As I show in the first part of this paper, this even holds for what is arguably the most sophisticated input-oriented theory to date, namely Karen Neander's informational teleosemantics. In the second part of the paper, I develop a new version of informational teleosemantics, drawing partly on empirical psychology, and (...) partly on philosophical considerations. I shall argue that this version has all the virtues of Neander's original theory, but also the further crucial advantage of being able to account for the distality of perceptual content. (shrink)

Teleosemantic theories of representation are often criticized as being “too liberal”, i.e. as categorizing states as representations which are not representational at all. Recently, a powerful version of this objection has been put forth by Tyler Burge. Focusing on perception, Burge defends the claim that all teleosemantic theories apply too broadly, thereby missing what is distinctive about representation. Contra Burge, I will argue in this paper that there is a teleosemantic account of perceptual states that does not fall prey to (...) this problem, and that we can arrive at this account by combining some of Burge’s insights with a producer-oriented version of teleosemantics. The resulting theory turns out to be attractive and perfectly coherent. By contrast, the coherence of Burge’s own anti-teleosemantic approach becomes quite doubtful under closer examination—or so I will argue. (shrink)

According to standard teleosemantics, intentional states are selectional states. This claim is put forward not as a conceptual analysis, but as a ‘theoretical reduction’—an a posteriori hypothesis analogous to ‘water = H2O’. Critics have tried to show that this meta-theoretical conception of teleosemantics leads to unacceptable consequences. In this paper, I argue that there is indeed a fundamental problem with the water/H2O analogy, as it is usually construed, and that teleosemanticists should therefore reject it. Fortunately, there exists a viable alternative (...) to the water/H2O model which avoids the fundamental problem, while explaining the a posteriori character of teleosemantics equally well. (shrink)

Truthmaker theorists hold that propositions about higher-level entities (e.g. the proposition that there is a heap of sand) are often made true by lower-level entities (e.g. by facts about the configuration of fundamental particles). This generates a problem: what should we say about these higher-level entities? On the one hand, they must exist (since there are true propositions about them), on the other hand, it seems that they are completely superfluous and should be banished for reasons of ontological parsimony. Some (...) truthmaker theorists—most prominently David Armstrong—have tried to solve this puzzle by arguing that these entities are ‘an ontological free lunch’, i.e. real existents that are still ‘no addition of being’. This answer is prima facie attractive, but I argue in this paper that the standard approaches to truthmaking—modal theories and grounding theories—are unable to vindicate the doctrine of the ontological free lunch, and thus fail to solve the problem of higher-level entities. Fortunately, there is a non-standard account of truthmaking available, the reductive explanation account, which succeeds where the standard approaches fail. (shrink)

Liberal representationalism is the view that even some internal states of very simple organisms like plants or bacteria count as genuine representations. This view has been heavily criticized by many authors, including myself. In a recent paper, Marc Artiga attempts to defend liberal representationalism against these criticisms. One of his main targets is an argument of explanatory exclusion that he ascribes to Burge, Ramsey, Rescorla, Sterelny and me (among others). In this paper, I reply to Artiga by distinguishing the exclusion (...) argument that he focuses on from what is, in my view, the real explanatory challenge for liberal representationalism, and I argue that none of the considerations put forward by Artiga in defense of the liberal view provide an adequate answer to this challenge. (shrink)

1. IntroductionIn What Biological Functions Are and Why They Matter, Justin Garson offers a novel theory of biological functions, the generalized selected effects (GSE) theory.1 He presents the theory in a clear and comprehensive way, defends it against various objections and applies it to different areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of psychiatry, the debate about mechanisms and the debate about teleosemantic theories of mental content.2Like other proponents of the aetiological approach to functions, Garson maintains that a trait’s biological functions (...) are grounded in its selectional history. However, his GSE theory differs from standard versions of the aetiological approach – so-called selected effects (SE) theories – in a crucial respect: while SE theories assume that all biological functions must ultimately be grounded in phylogenetic processes of natural selection or other (closely analogous) processes of differential reproduction (Millikan 1984: 15–82, Neander 1991, Godfrey-Smith 1994), the GSE theory allows that functions may also be grounded in processes of differential retention (see §2 for details). Garson forcefully argues that this broader account is theoretically well-motivated and has significant advantages over standard SE accounts when it comes to accommodating certain important classes of ontogenetically determined functions. (shrink)

The compatibilism debate revolves around the question whether moral responsibility and free will are compatible with determinism. Prima facie, this seems to be a substantial issue. But according to the triviality objection, the disagreement is merely verbal: compatibilists and incompatibilists, it is maintained, are talking past each other, since they use the terms “free will” and “moral responsibility” in different senses. In this paper I argue, first, that the triviality objection is indeed a formidable one and that the standard replies (...) to it are unconvincing. This, however, does not mean that the objection succeeds. Starting with the debate about moral responsibility, I attempt to show that there is an account of moral responsibility which enables us to defend the compatibilism debate against the charge of triviality—namely, the normative conception of moral responsibility. If “moral responsibility” is defined in normative terms, then we cannot distinguish between a compatibilist and an incompatibilist sense of “moral responsibility”, because such a disambiguation would be inconsistent with the essential action-guiding force of normative expressions. Finally, I examine how the normative conception of moral responsibility can help us to defend the free will debate against the triviality objection and draw some general conclusions. (shrink)

Desires, or directive representations, are central components of human and animal minds. Nevertheless, desires are largely neglected in current debates about the naturalization of representational content. Most naturalists seem to assume that some version of the standard teleological approach, which identifies the content of a desire with a specific kind of effect that the desire has the function of producing, will turn out to be correct. In this paper I argue, first, that this common assumption is unjustified, since the standard (...) approach is in fact deeply problematic. Secondly, I propose an alternative account of the content of desires which, while generating plausible and determinate content ascriptions, avoids the main problem that plagues the standard approach, and is also preferable on other grounds. (shrink)

Sensory perceptions represent things in the outside world. This mundane fact raises a major problem for naturalistic theories of content: the ‘distality problem’. In a previous paper for this journal, I presented a solution to this problem which makes central appeal to constancy mechanisms. Justin Garson, also in this journal, recently criticized my solution and suggested a Dretskean alternative to it. Here, I defend my proposal by arguing, first, that Garson's criticisms ultimately miss the mark, and secondly, that his Dretskean (...) alternative is not viable, because it faces two fundamental problems: the empirical problem and the problem of changing response functions. (shrink)

This paper deals with the wrongness of having sex with someone without her valid consent. There are good reasons to think that deception about deal-breakers invalidate consent to sex and that acting without valid consent wrongs the consenter. Tom Dougherty argues that it is always seriously wrong to deceive another person into sex by deceiving her. We should on his view therefore reject the view that doing so is in certain cases only a minor wrong. It will be argued here (...) that we should accept this view. I will argue against Dougherty that the lenient view does not presuppose an unacceptably moralistic view of sexuality. In addition, the lenient view can be defended by what I call the harm view of the wrongness of having sex without valid consent. If no or only mild harm is caused deceiving someone into sex is only a minor wrong. (shrink)

Consent that is voluntary, informed and given by a competent person sometimes transforms a wrong into a right act. How does consent that meets these requirements change the moral property of an act, namely that of being a wronging of a person? This is the question this paper will deal with. Some authors argue that valid consent changes the moral property of an act by changing the reasons which speak against the act. This account of the normative force of consent (...) will be critically examined and rejected. An alternative model will then be put forward and defended according to which consent changes the moral property of an act if and only if the wrong‐making property of the act is that it is not consented to. The upshot will be that consent does not eliminate the wrong‐making property if the unconsented act is wrong for other reasons than not being consented to. (shrink)

The so-called resource curse raises moral issues. Who, if anyone, is morally responsible for it? This article argues that this question amounts to: who is blameworthy for the violations of people's property rights? The international oil companies are blameworthy for the violations of property rights only in the case of complicity, not in the normal purchase case. Yet the international community has to take action against massive violations of property rights. The article discusses different measures, and criticizes voluntary initiatives such (...) as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative for not making the states accountable to their people. In this line of thought, it argues for an extension of the mandate of the International Criminal Court: massive violations of property rights should be prosecuted at the international level. (shrink)

Fred Dretske’s account of mental causation, developed in Explaining Behavior and defended in numerous articles, is generally regarded as one of the most interesting and most ambitious approaches in the field. According to Dretske, meaning facts, construed historically as facts about the indicator functions of internal states, are the structuring causes of behavior. In this article, we argue that Dretske’s view is untenable: On closer examination, the real structuring causes of behavior turn out to be markedly different from Dretske’s meaning (...) facts. Our argument proceeds in three steps. First, we set forth the problem of meaning individuation: We argue that the proposal that meaning facts are structuring causes of behavior commits Dretske to a very fine-grained individuation of meanings that is deeply counterintuitive. In a second step, we show that even these finely individuated meaning facts cannot do the job that they are supposed to do, since information facts—which are constitutive of, but distinct from Dretske’s meaning facts—are better candidates for the role of structuring causes. Finally, we argue that it is not even information facts, but facts of co-instantiation which are the real structuring causes of behavior. In concluding, we briefly consider the options that are left for Dretske if our arguments succeed. (shrink)

According to Doris Schroeder, the view that human rights derive from human dignity should be rejected. She thinks that this is the case for three different reasons: the first has to do with the fact that the dominant concept of dignity is based on religious beliefs which will do no justificatory work in a secular society; the second is that the dominant secular view of dignity, which is the Kantian view, does not provide us with a justification of human rights, (...) i.e. rights all humans have; and the third reason has to do with the fact that dignity is understood in too many different ways to provide us with a justification of human rights. It is argued in this paper that none of these reasons for separating human rights from human dignity is convincing. It is true, it will be argued, that some accounts of dignity will not be successful in justifying human rights. But there is no reason to assume that no account of human dignity is capable of doing this. In the final part of the paper a concept of human dignity is presented that could indeed provide us with a justificatory basis for human rights. (shrink)

Regulations designed to prevent global inequalities in the use of genetic resources apply to both commercial and non-commercial research. Conflating the two may have unintended consequences for collaboration between the Global North and biodiverse countries in the Global South, which may promote global injustice rather than mitigate it.

Peter Achinstein has argued at length and on many occasions that the view according to which evidential support is defined in terms of probability-raising faces serious counterexamples and, hence, should be abandoned. Proponents of the positive probabilistic relevance view have remained unconvinced. The debate seems to be in a deadlock. This paper is an attempt to move the debate forward and revisit some of the central claims within this debate. My conclusion here will be that while Achinstein may be (...) right that his counterexamples undermine probabilistic relevance views of what it is for e to be evidence that h, there is still room for a defence of a related probabilistic view about an increase in being supported, according to which, if p > p, then h is more supported given e than it is without e. My argument relies crucially on an insight from recent work on the linguistics of gradable adjectives. (shrink)

Peter Achinstein has argued at length and on many occasions that the view according to which evidential support is defined in terms of probability-raising faces serious counterexamples and, hence, should be abandoned. Proponents of the positive probabilistic relevance view have remained unconvinced. The debate seems to be in a deadlock. This paper is an attempt to move the debate forward and revisit some of the central claims within this debate. My conclusion here will be that while Achinstein may be (...) right that his counterexamples undermine probabilistic relevance views of what it is for e to be evidence that h, there is still room for a defence of a related probabilistic view about an increase in being supported, according to which, if p > p, then h is more supported given e than it is without e. My argument relies crucially on an insight from recent work on the linguistics of gradable adjectives. (shrink)

Peter Lipton; VI*—Is the Best Good Enough?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 93, Issue 1, 1 June 1993, Pages 89–104, https://doi.org/10.1093/aris.

R S Peters; Education and Justification, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 11, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 28–38, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1.

Peter Alexander; XIII*—The Names of Secondary Qualities, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 77, Issue 1, 1 June 1977, Pages 203–220, https://doi.or.

Peter Downing; V—Entailment, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 66, Issue 1, 1 June 1966, Pages 15–26, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/66.1.15.

Peter Downing; V—Entailment, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 66, Issue 1, 1 June 1966, Pages 15–26, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/66.1.15.

Peter Hylton; XV*—Translation, Meaning, and Self-Knowledge†, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 269–290, https://do.

Peter Gardner; Personal Autonomy and Religious Upbringing: the ‘problem’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 25, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 69–81, http.

Peter Gardner; Personal Autonomy and Religious Upbringing: the ‘problem’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 25, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 69–81, http.

Peter Gardner; The Paradox of Moral Education: a reassessment, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 39–48, https://doi.org.

Peter Alexander; XIII*—The Names of Secondary Qualities, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 77, Issue 1, 1 June 1977, Pages 203–220, https://doi.or.

Peter Hylton; XV*—Translation, Meaning, and Self-Knowledge†, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 269–290, https://do.

Peter Gardner; The Paradox of Moral Education: a reassessment, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 39–48, https://doi.org.

Peter Winch; VIII—Can a Good Man be Harmed?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 66, Issue 1, 1 June 1966, Pages 55–70, https://doi.org/10.1093/aris.

Peter Gardner; Religious Education: in defence of non-commitment, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 157–168, https://do.

Peter Gardner; Religious Education: in defence of non-commitment, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 157–168, https://do.

I hypothesize that re-occurring prior experience of complex systems mobilizes a fast response, whose attractor is encoded by their strongly connected network core. In contrast, responses to novel stimuli are often slow and require the weakly connected network periphery. Upon repeated stimulus, peripheral network nodes remodel the network core that encodes the attractor of the new response. This “core-periphery learning” theory reviews and generalizes the heretofore fragmented knowledge on attractor formation by neural networks, periphery-driven innovation, and a number of recent (...) reports on the adaptation of protein, neuronal, and social networks. The core-periphery learning theory may increase our understanding of signaling, memory formation, information encoding and decision-making processes. Moreover, the power of network periphery-related “wisdom of crowds” inventing creative, novel responses indicates that deliberative democracy is a slow yet efficient learning strategy developed as the success of a billion-year evolution. Also see the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/IIjP7zWGjVE. The network core triggers fast responses to previously experienced stimuli. Innovations require the network periphery that encodes a novel attractor by core-remodeling. This core-periphery learning theory is introduced as a general adaptation, learning, decision-making, and forgetting mechanism of all complex systems including protein, metabolic, signaling, neuronal, social networks, and ecosystems. (shrink)

R S Peters; Education and the Educated Man, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 4, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 5–20, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.

Peter Long; V*—Entailment: A Modal Distinction, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 79, Issue 1, 1 June 1979, Pages 79–88, https://doi.org/10.1093/a.

Peter Smith; On ‘The Objects of Perceptual Experience’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 191–196, https://doi.org.

Peter Gardner; On Some Paradoxes in Moral Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 65–76, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.

Peter Gardner; On Some Paradoxes in Moral Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 65–76, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.

Peter Carruthers; II*—Frege's Regress, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 82, Issue 1, 1 June 1982, Pages 17–32, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteli.

Peter Milne; VII*—Tarski, Truth and Model Theory, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 99, Issue 1, 1 June 1999, Pages 141–168, https://doi.org/10.11.

Peter Smith; XIV*—The Butterfly Effect, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 247–268, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristot.

Peter Smith; XIV*—The Butterfly Effect, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 247–268, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristot.

Peter Gardner; ‘Private Judgement’, Mill and Tocqueville: an apology, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 26, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 113–115, https.

Peter Gardner; ‘Private Judgement’, Mill and Tocqueville: an apology, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 26, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 113–115, https.

Peter Urbach; X*—Random Sampling and the Principles of Estimation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 143–164, http.